Before The
State Of Wisconsin
DIVISION OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

In the Matter of [Student]
v.
Milwaukee Academy of Science

 
Case No.: LEA-03-028

RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Parties to this proceeding are:

[Student], by Attorney Robert Theine Pledl
Schott, Bublitz & Engel, S.C.
16655 W. Bluemound Rd., #330
Brookfield, WI 53005

Milwaukee Academy of Science, by

Attorney Renae Waterman
Quarles & Brady, LLP
Suite 2040
411 East Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, WI 53202-4497
BACKGROUND

On July 21, 2003, the Department of Public Instruction received a request for a due process hearing under Wis. Stats. Chapter 115, and the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") from Attorney Robert Pledl, representing [Mother and Father] (the "Parents") on behalf of [Student] (the "Student") on November 20, 2002, and referred the matter to this division for hearing. The Parents' due process hearing request alleges that the Milwaukee Academy of Science (the "Academy") failed to provide the Student with a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") during the 2000-01 and 2001-02 school years.

Pre-hearing telephone conferences were held on August 6 and September 3, 2003. On August 6, 2003, at the parties' request, the deadline for issuing a decision in this matter was extended to October 3, 2003.

On August 6, 2003, the Academy filed a motion for summary judgment with attached exhibits on the grounds that the parents' hearing request is time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations contained in Chapter 115 of the Wisconsin Statutes. The Parents filed a brief opposing the motion for summary judgment on August 29, 2003, and filed supporting documentation on September 2, 2003. The Academy filed a response brief and affidavit in support of its motion for summary judgment on September 9, 2003.

Discussion

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidentiary material shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Moulas v. PBC Productions, Inc., 213 Wis.2d 406,410, 570 N.W.2d 739 (Ct. App. 1997). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Fisher v. Transco Servs.-Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir. 1992).

Only a "genuine" issue of "material" fact will defeat an otherwise proper motion for summary judgment. Appleton Area School Dist. v. Benson and K.T., 32 IDELR 91 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). A material fact is one which, under the governing substantive law, "might affect the outcome of the suit." Appleton, 32 IDELR 91 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A dispute over a material fact "is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the nonmoving party." Id. The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact and may meet its burden "by demonstrating that 'there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.'" Id. at 325.

A material fact in the case at hand is whether or not the Academy provided the Parents with notice of their parental rights, including the right to request a due process hearing. The Academy claims to have provided such notice to [Mother] on October 27, 2000. In support, the Academy offered the affidavits of two Academy employees who state that they met with [Mother] on October 27, 2000 and that she was provided with a notice of procedural safeguards on that date. The Academy attached a copy of the statement of parental rights to its motion.

The Parents deny that they received notice of their parental rights from the Academy. In her supporting affidavit, [Mother] denies receiving such notice, denies receiving notice of or attending an IEP team meeting on October 27, 2000, and denies ever meeting with the two Academy employees who provided affidavits. However, exhibit A attached to the Parent's brief contains a Notice of Reevaluation addressed to [Mother] that is initialed by "BC" (one of the employees who provided an affidavit) and dated October 27, 2000, indicating that the statement of parental rights was sent with the notice on that date. Moreover, Parent's exhibit A also contains a Notice and Consent to Conduct Additional Tests that shows [Mother]' signature granting consent on October 27, 2000.

While viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the Parents, I find that there is an absence of evidence to support their claim that they did not receive notice of parental rights. Based upon the evidence provided, I do not believe that a reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the Parents; therefore, no genuine issue of material fact exists here. The material facts are as follows.

The Student is a child who was identified as a child with a disability by the Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS) in 1998. He attended MPS during the 1999-2000 school year. The Student attended the Academy during the 2000-01 and 2001-02 school years. The Academy provided a notice of procedural safeguards to [Mother] on October 27, 2000. The notice contained detailed information about the right to request a due process hearing. The notice did not include information about the applicable statute of limitations for requesting a due process hearing. The 2002 school year ended on June 19, 2002. The Student re-enrolled in MPS for the 2002-03 school year. The Parents filed their request for a due process hearing against the Academy on July 21, 2003.

Statute of Limitations

Section 115.80(1)(a), Wis. Stats. establishes a one year statute of limitations period for filing due process hearing requests, as follows:

A parent, or the attorney representing the child, may file a written request with the division for a hearing within one year after the refusal or proposal of the local educational agency to initiate or change his or her child's evaluation, individualized education program, educational placement or the provision of a free appropriate public education, except that, if the local educational agency has not previously provided the parent or the attorney representing the child with notice of the right to request a hearing under this subdivision, he or she may file a request under this subdivision within one year after the local educational agency provides the notice. … The Parents did not file their request for a due process hearing within one year of the Academy's alleged failure to provide FAPE to the Student. As stated previously, the evidence provided by the parties shows that the Parent received notice of parental rights, including the right to request a hearing, on October 27, 2000.

The Parents argue that the notice was defective in that it failed to include information about the one-year statute of limitations contained in § 115.80 (1)(a), Wis. Stats. The Parents provided a copy of the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction's recommended statement of parent rights that includes notice of the statute of limitations, but local education agencies are not legally required to adopt and distribute that particular statement of parental rights. Neither the Wisconsin statutes nor the IDEA and its implementing regulations contain a specific requirement that local education agencies provide parents with notice of the statute of limitations applicable to due process hearings. See § 115.80 (1)(a), Wis. Stats., 20 USCA § 1415, and 34 CFR § 300.507.

The Parent cites cases from the Fourth Circuit in support of its contention that failure to include the applicable statute of limitations prevents a district from enforcing the statute of limitations defense against parents. However, in R.R. v. Fairfax County School Board, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held that "[t]here is simply no basis in the text of the IDEA or its implementing regulations for imposing a requirement that [the district] provide [the student] with notice of Virginia's two-year limitations period applicable to due process hearings." 39 IDELR 153 (4th Cir. 2003).

The Parent further argues that the "discovery rule" extends the statute of limitations period in this case. I find their argument unpersuasive. As stated by the U.S. Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin when discussing the statute of limitations contained in § 115.80 (1)(a), Wis. Stats., "the Wisconsin legislature contemplated only this narrow exception to the one-year period and refrained from enacting others." Vandenberg v. Appleton Area School Dist., 38 IDELR 240 (E.D. Wis. 2003).

ORDER

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ordered that the above-captioned matter is dismissed with prejudice.

Dated at Madison, Wisconsin on September 12, 2003.

STATE OF WISCONSIN
DIVISION OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
5005 University Avenue, Suite 201
Madison, Wisconsin 53705-5400
Telephone: (608) 266-7709
FAX: (608) 264-9885
By:____________________________________
Sally M. Pederson
Administrative Law Judge

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS

APPEAL TO COURT: Within 45 days after the decision of the administrative law judge has been issued, either party may appeal the decision to the circuit court for the county in which the child resides under §115.80(7), Wis. Stats., or to federal district court pursuant to U.S.C. §1415 and 34 C.F.R. §300.512.

A copy of the appeal should also be sent to the Division of Hearings and Appeals, 5005 University Avenue, Suite 201, Madison, WI 53705-5400.

The Division will prepare and file the record with the court only upon receipt of a copy of the appeal.