In a letter dated March 18, 1997, [Father] requested a due process hearing on behalf of his son, [Student]. A series of telephone prehearing conferences followed as the parties attempted to resolve the matter without the necessity of a hearing. On May 23, 1997, the undersigned administrative law judge ordered [Student] to undergo an independent educational evaluation by Dr. Bonnie Carlson-Green. Dr. Carlson-Green conducted her evaluation on August 7 and 14, 1997, and submitted her report to the parties on or about August 25, 1997. Based on Dr. Carlson-Green's recommendations, the parties developed an interim individualized educational plan (IEP) for [Student]. A conference call was subsequently held on September 25, 1997, during which the parties reported that they had been unable to reach a settlement agreement. Accordingly, on October 10, 1997, the parties agreed to address the following issues at the due process hearing: (1) Whether [Student] was denied a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) when the District allegedly failed to provide him with transportation to his transition services as required by his IEP; (2) Whether the District violated [Student]'s right to privacy when it allegedly shared personally identifiable information about him with personnel from the University of Wisconsin-[City] without written permission; and (3) Whether [Student]'s current IEP provides him with a free and appropriate public education.

The due process hearing in this matter was held on October 28 and November 6, 1997. The parties filed post-hearing briefs on November 24 and December 9, 1997. On December 15, 1997, the undersigned administrative law judge received a telephone call from [Mother], [Student]'s mother. [Mother] indicated that [Student] had withdrawn from the [Unnamed] School District and that he did not intend to return. She further indicated that [Student] had moved to xxxxxxxxxxxxx, Minnesota, and was residing there with her. On January 13, 1998, [Student] contacted the undersigned administrative law judge by telephone. He confirmed that he had moved to Minnesota and was currently residing there with his mother. He further indicated that he had enrolled in the Roseville School District and was pursuing his high school diploma through their adult basic education program.

Whether [Student]'s due process claim is rendered moot because he is no longer a resident of the [Unnamed] School District?

According to Nashaminy School District v. Karla B., 25 IDELR 725 (1997), "[t]o sustain jurisdiction, a dispute must not only be alive when filed, but throughout its pendancy." (citations omitted) And, "[o]rdinarily, an action which becomes moot must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Id. In Nashaminy, the court ruled that prospective relief in the form of an IEP and in-service training were moot because subsequent to the complaint being filed, Karla B. and her son Blake moved out of the Nashaminy school district and in to another one. Accordingly, the court held that the new school district was now responsible to provide Blake with a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) and all the related procedural safeguards under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), rather than the Nashaminy school district.

In the case at hand, the facts are substantially similar. After the due process hearing had been held, [Student], who is eighteen years old, decided to withdraw from the [Unnamed] School District. He then left Wisconsin and moved to Minnesota where he is currently residing with his mother. In addition, [Student] has begun attending classes in the Roseville School District. Consequently, it is now the Roseville School District's responsibility to provide [Student] with a FAPE under the IDEA rather than the [Unnamed] School District. Therefore, the undersigned administrative law judge can not award [Father] the relief he seeks. There is no actual, ongoing controversy with respect to the relief this forum can adjudicate. Thus, these proceedings are moot with respect to the relief that is sought.

NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this due process proceeding is dismissed.

Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 23rd day of January, 1998.