In a letter dated May 15, 1997, [Father] requested a due process hearing on behalf of his son, [Student]. A series of telephone prehearing conferences were subsequently held. On August 19, 1997, at the request of the parties, a prehearing conference was held in person at the [Unnamed] School District' Administrative Offices. Participating in the conference were Susan Bickert, attorney for the [Unnamed] School District (MPS) and George Kotsonis, attorney for [Father]. After an extensive discussion, the parties agreed to address the following issues at the due process hearing: (1) Whether the written report of the social worker contains erroneous information; (2) Whether the M-team report erroneously relied upon the social work report and whether, therefore, the M-team report is inappropriate; (3) Whether the IEP conference for [Student] was properly convened; and (4) Whether the undersigned administrative law judge has the authority to remove the social worker's report from [Student]'s school records.

On September 24, 1997, the due process hearing was begun. The hearing was adjourned and scheduled to reconvene on November 11, 1997. In the meantime, however, Ms. Bickert submitted a Motion to Dismiss on November 4, 1997, to the undersigned administrative law judge. The motion requested that the due process hearing be dismissed on two grounds; first, because [Father] no longer had proper standing and, second, because the hearing had become moot. On November 7, 1997, a motion hearing was held via telephone. Ms. Bickert reported that [Student] was now living with his mother and would begin attending school in [City2] on November 10, 1997.

At the outset of these proceedings, [Father] and [Mother], the parents of [Student], were in the midst of a divorce. On September 29, 1997, a divorce was granted to the XXXXX by the Honorable William J. Haese. According to the divorce decree, [Mother] was granted primary physical placement of her son. As a result, [Student] now resides with his mother in [City2], Wisconsin, and has begun attending school in the [City2] School District. Additionally, the divorce decree provides that [Mother] has the sole authority to make all educational decisions for [Student]. Because [Student]'s residence and his educational placement have both changed, the District maintains that [Father] no longer has standing to pursue a due process hearing with the [Unnamed School District] and that his cause of action is therefore moot.

I. Whether [Father] has standing to pursue a due process hearing on behalf of his son [Student]?

II. Whether [Father]'s due process hearing is rendered moot because his son, [Student], is no longer a resident of the City of [Unnamed] and is not attending the [Unnamed School District] system?

According to Nashaminy School District v. Karla B., 25 IDELR 725 (1997), "[t]o sustain jurisdiction, a dispute must not only be alive when filed, but throughout its pendancy." (citations omitted) And, "[o]rdinarily, an action which becomes moot must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Id. In Nashaminy, the court ruled that prospective relief in the form of an IEP and in-service training were moot because subsequent to the complaint being filed, Karla B. and her son Blake moved out of the Nashaminy school district and in to another one. Accordingly, the court held that the new school district was now responsible to provide Blake with a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) and all the related procedural safeguards under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), rather than the Nashaminy school district.

In the case at hand, the facts are substantially similar. After the filing of the due process request, Mr. and Mrs. XXXXX were granted a divorce. As a result of their divorce, [Mother] was granted primary physical placement of [Student] and the sole authority to make educational decisions on his behalf. [Student] is now residing with his mother in [City2], not in [City1]. In addition, [Student] has begun attending the [City2] schools. Consequently, it is now [City2]'s responsibility to provide [Student] with a FAPE under the IDEA, rather than the [Unnamed School District]'. Therefore, the undersigned administrative law judge (ALJ) cannot award [Father] the relief he seeks. There is no actual, ongoing controversy with respect to the relief that this forum can adjudicate. Thus, these proceedings are moot with respect to the relief that is sought.

NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this due process hearing is dismissed.

Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 10th day of November, 1997.