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State Of Wisconsin DIVISION OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
On October 9, 1998 the Department of Public Instruction received a request for a due process hearing under Wis. Stat. ch. 115 (1997-98) and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq., requesting reimbursement for the cost of [Student]'s enrollment in a private school for the 1997-98 and 1998-99 school years. Prehearing conferences were held on October 19, 1998, November 9, 1998, November 23, 1998, December 4, 1998, January 12, 1999 and January 20, 1999. The hearing was conducted on March 16 and 17, 1999. At the request of both parties, the date for the issuance of a final decision was extended to May 31, 1999. Based on the entire record and arguments in this case, this is the final decision and order of the undersigned Administrative Law Judge. FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
OPINION Timeliness of the Hearing Request The hearing request in this matter was filed on October 9, 1998, over one year after the parents rejected the initial IEP and educational placement offered by the school district. Although Wis. Stat. § 115.80 (1)(a) now contains a one year time limit for the submission of such a due process hearing request, several factors lead me to conclude that the statute does not bar consideration of the current request. First, that time limit was enacted on June 19, 1998, well after the parents rejected the first IEP. See, 1997 Wis. Act 251. Second, the statute contains an express provision that allows a due process request to survive if the district has not provided the parent, or the attorney representing the child, with notice of the time limit. No evidence was presented in this case that such a notice was ever provided to the parents or their attorney. Third, other jurisdictions that have addressed a similar issue on non-statutory grounds have not limited the hearing request to one year. See Bernardsville Board of Education v. J.H., 42 F.3rd 149 (3rd Cir. 1994). Finally, this issue was not raised by the district until the submission of written arguments following the close of testimony. Issues of this nature should be raised prior to the hearing. Under all of the circumstances, therefore, I do not find the district’s arguments on the timeliness of the hearing request persuasive and I will address the merits of the parents’ underlying request for tuition reimbursement. The Burden of Proof The district also contends that the burden is on the parents to show that the IEPs offered by the district were inappropriate. I disagree. The burden of proof in IDEA cases has been well established over the past ten years and clearly falls on the school district. In Lascari v. Ramapo Indian Hills Regular High Sch. Dist., 116 N.J. 30, 560 A.2d 1189, EHLR 441:565 (1989), for example, the court held: We believe that the obligation of parents at the due process hearing should be merely to place in issue the appropriateness of the IEP. The School Board should then bear the burden of proving that the IEP was appropriate. In reaching this result, we have sought to implement the intent of the statutory and regulatory schemes. See also: Richfield Joint Sch. Dist. 1, 18 IDELR 168, 172 (SEA WI 1991) and Jessieville School District, 28 IDELR 697 (SEA AR 1998). Accordingly, I am satisfied that the school district bears the burden of proving that the district offered to provide the student a free appropriate public education.
The 1997-98 IEP Both federal and state law give parents the right to recover the cost of a private school enrollment if the public school district did not make a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) available to the child in a timely manner before that enrollment. See, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.403, and Wis. Stat. §115.791. The United States Supreme Court has described the statutory history and purpose of IDEA and the requirement of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) as follows: [IDEA] was designed to fill the need identified in the House Report - that is, to provide a "basic floor of opportunity" consistent with equal protection - neither [IDEA] nor its history persuasively demonstrates that Congress thought that equal protection required anything more than equal access. Therefore, Congress' desire to provide specialized educational services, even in furtherance of "equality," cannot be read as imposing any particular substantive educational standard upon the States. The District Court and the Court of Appeals thus erred when they held that [IDEA] requires New York to maximize the potential of each handicapped child commensurate with the opportunity provided nonhandicapped children. Desirable though that goal might be, it is not the standard that Congress imposed upon States which receive funding under [IDEA]. Rather, Congress sought primarily to identify and evaluate handicapped children, and to provide them with access to a free public education. Implicit in the congressional purpose of providing access to a "free appropriate public education" is the requirement that the education to which access is provided be sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child. . . . We therefore conclude that the "basic floor of opportunity" provided by [IDEA] consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child. Rowley v. Bd. Of Education., 458 U.S. 176, at 200-01, (1976). On the issue of whether a handicapped child is receiving FAPE, the Supreme Court held: Insofar as a State is required to provide a handicapped child with a "free appropriate public education," we hold that it satisfies this requirement by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction. Such instruction and services must be provided at public expense, must meet the State's educational standards, must approximate the grade levels used in the State's regular education, and must comport with the child's IEP. In addition, the IEP, and therefore the personalized instruction, should be formulated in accordance with the requirements of [IDEA] and, if the child is being educated in the regular classrooms of the public education system, should be reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade. Rowley, at 203-04. Applying this test to the current case, I am satisfied that the 1997-98 IEP (Exhibit # 6.) was reasonably calculated to provide the student with an educational benefit and that it offered the student a FAPE. The IEP was an initial placement in special education and included 375 minutes of specialized instruction each week to address the student’s learning disabilities and an additional 50 minutes of specialized instruction to address speech and language issues. The district committed no procedural irregularities in the development of this IEP and the parents did not voice any objections to the proposed IEP until well after the last IEP team meeting and well after the district had mailed the parents a written educational placement based on that IEP. The parents’ concern that the plan failed to address the student’s documented auditory processing problems overlooks the fact that the IEP did include specific speech and language goals to "achieve auditory discrimination" for certain sounds. (Exhibit # 6, page 7.) Auditory discrimination is one part of auditory processing. See, Special Education Dictionary, LRP Publications (1997) at page 22. Taking the 1997-98 IEP as a whole, therefore, I am satisfied that it was a reasonable and appropriate individualized educational program and that it provided the student a FAPE. Although the parents now claim otherwise, their initial objection to the 1997-98 IEP was primarily a disagreement over instructional methodology. The parents preferred using the Orton-Gillingham methodology as opposed to direct instruction. (Letter of August 8, 1997, Exhibit # 10.) It is well established, however, that parents do not have the right to compel a school district to provide a specific instructional program or employ a specific instructional methodology. See, Lachman v. Illinois State Bd. Of Educ. 852 F.2d 290, 297 (7th Cir. 1988); Richmond Community Schs., 29 IDELR 443 (SEA IN 1998) and Logue v. Shawnee Mission Pub. Sch., 25 IDELR 587 (1997). Accordingly, I am satisfied that the district offered to provide a free and appropriate public education to this student before the student enrolled in the private school for the start of the 1997-98 school year. The 1998-99 IEP The 1998-99 school year began on August 24, 1998. Just twelve days earlier, the district received a letter from an attorney writing on behalf of the parents. In that letter, the attorney indicated that the parents rejected the placement proposed by the district and indicated that they intended to enroll the student in a private school for the 1998-99 school year at what they believed would be the public expense. Upon receipt of this letter, the district began a process to review and revise the previous IEP. The IEP was completed on December 14, 1998. The revised IEP (Exhibit # 13) increased the proposed special education instruction to 1170 minutes per week for learning disabilities and 75 minutes per week (including consultation) for speech and language. It also contained goals to address auditory discrimination and other reading, speech and language issues. As in the case of the 1997-98 IEP, this IEP was reasonably calculated to provide an educational benefit and to provide a free appropriate public education. The IEP was reject by the parents, however, largely because it was offered during the middle of the school year. The parent’s contend that the delay in the preparation of this IEP denied their daughter a FAPE. Although Wis. Stat. § 115.787(1) appears to require that a school district have an IEP in effect at the beginning of the school year for each child with a disability that resides within the district, I am persuaded that this requirement does not apply to students who have been unilaterally placed in a private school by their parents. Students who have been unilaterally enrolled in a private school are not entitled a FAPE. See, Letter to McKethan, 29 IDELR 907 (OSEP 1998) and Letter to Rothman, 30 IDELR 269 (OSEP 1998).
"School districts generally meet their obligations to make FAPE available to disabled students by offering them an appropriate public school program or by placing them at an appropriate private school at public expense. However, when FAPE has been offered, and the parent chooses not to accept the program offered to their child by the local school district, and instead elects to enroll their child in a private school, then the district is not required to pay for that child’s private education. In the event that the parent(s) decide to return the child to public school, FAPE must be provided (emphasis added). 30 IDELR at 269. It is not surprising, therefore, that some courts have specifically held that a school district is not expressly required to develop and implement, on an annual basis, an IEP for a disabled student once the student has been placed in a private school by his parents. See, Amann v. Stowe Sch. System, 982 F.2d 644, 651 (1st Cir. 1992) and Carl D. v. Special School of St. Louis County, 28 IDELR 864, 871-872 (E.D. Mo. 1998). This conclusion is also shared by the author of The Answer Book on Special Education Law, second edition (1997), LRP Publications, at ch. 10:13. "When the parents [of a privately placed student] are disputing the appropriateness of the program offered by the district, the school district is required to keep updating the IEP during the pendency of the due process proceedings and any appeals therefrom until the dispute is resolved. There is no legal obligation to do so when there is no dispute with the parents and the student is not receiving any services from the school district under 34 C.F.R. § 300.403(a)." (Emphasis added) Accordingly, I am satisfied that the district was not required to develop and implement, on an annual basis, an IEP for the student after she had been unilaterally placed in the private school by her parents. Even if I were to conclude that the district was required to have an IEP in effect for this student by the start of the new school year, however, the district’s failure to do so under the facts of this case would not justify reimbursement for the student’s tuition in the private school. As already noted, the district had offered to provide a FAPE to the student before the student enrolled in the private school for the start of the 1997-98 school year. The parents did not reject the district’s proposed placement until August 8, 1997, more than two months after the IEP had been finalized and only days before the start of the school year. The district reasonably assumed after that date that the student would not re-enroll in public school and informed the parents on August 25, 1997, that the district process of developing the student’s appropriate educational program would not begin until she re-entered public school. (Exhibit # 17.) Nothing further was heard from the parents for almost one year, until August 10, 1998, when their attorney wrote the district and stated that the parents were going to again enroll the student in a private school at what they believed would be "the public expense". The student then re-enrolled in the private school on August 18, 1998 (Exhibit # 20, page 4), six days before the start of the 1998-99 public school year. Since the student was already receiving an education from a private school while the district reviewed its obligation to provide FAPE for the 1998-99 school year, the actions of the district did not deprive her of any educational benefit. Taking the evidence as a whole, therefore, I am satisfied that the equities of the case favor the district and that the claim for tuition reimbursement should be denied. The one remaining issue raised by the parties concerns the appropriateness and sufficiency of the student’s unilateral placement at the private school. Tuition reimbursement is not an appropriate remedy if the private placement itself is not appropriate. See, Florence County Sch. Dist. v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 14 (1993). Although this issue is rendered moot by the earlier findings, I will address it for the sake of completeness. Taking the evidence as a whole, I am inclined to believe that the private school placement provided some educational benefit to the student even though the IEPs developed by the private school were not as extensive as the IEPs developed by the district and failed to include a provision for physical therapy. This seems particularly true in light of the testimony that the student’s skills and abilities were increasing, that she was receiving passing grades and that she was progressing from grade-to-grade. All things considered, therefore, I am satisfied that the private placement provided an appropriate education for the student. This factor alone, however, does not justify reimbursement for the cost of that placement. ORDER NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the request for tuition reimbursement is denied and that the due process request of [Student] is dismissed. Dated at Madison, Wisconsin on May 27, 1999. STATE OF WISCONSIN
By:_______________________________________
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS APPEAL TO COURT. Within 45 days after the decision of the administrative law judge has been issued, either party may appeal the decision to the circuit court for the county in which the child resides under §115.80(7), Wis. Stats., or to federal district court pursuant to 20 U.S.C. §1415 and 34 C.F.R. §300.511. |